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Abstract: 
 
We examine the impact of micro health insurance placement on health awareness, healthcare 
utilization and health status of microcredit members in rural Bangladesh, using data from 329 
households in the operating areas of Grameen Bank. The results are based on econometric analysis 
conditioned on placement of the scheme, and show that placement has a positive association with 
all of the outcomes. The results are statistically significant for health awareness and healthcare 
utilization, but not for heath status. Our study makes an important contribution to the literature as it 
provides evidence on the impact of MHI on a broad set of health outcomes.  
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EVALUATING THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF MICRO HEALTH INSURANCE PLACEMENT: 
EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Microcredit provides collateral free small loans, especially to women, to enable them to develop 
household based micro enterprises. A key aim is to break the vicious circle of poverty where low 
income leads to low saving, therefore low investment, thus low income. The importance of 
microinsurance emanates from the limitations of conventional loan-based microcredit programs in 
protecting the poor from all sorts of vulnerabilities. Although microcredit has been shown to 
generate various beneficial outcomes, there is also evidence that not all sectors of the poor can 
benefit. One such group are those who experience severe health shocks, which reduce work 
capacity and investment and require a redirection of resources to the consumption of healthcare. 
Due to increased evidence that microcredit does not help the poorest poor, welfarists stress the 
value of adding auxiliary services to improve the effectiveness of the programs (e.g. Bhatt, 2001; 
Woller et al., 1999; Woller and Woodworth, 2001). Insurance can protect vulnerable people from 
risks and shocks when existing coping strategies fail. However, traditional health insurance markets 
are almost entirely absent in the rural areas of Bangladesh. There is no social health insurance 
scheme even in the formal sector, and in addition the government has not been able to meet the 
health care needs of the rural poor.   
 
Grameen Bank1 (GB) has played a major role in developing microcredit in Bangladesh. The 
organization emerged from an action research project by Professor Muhammad Yunus in 1976 
examining the possibility of providing banking services for the rural poor. GB as a microfinance 
institution (MFI) provides a number of services including loans and savings schemes. It added a 
micro health insurance (MHI) scheme in the late 1990s, in order to protect its clients from health 
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risks with the aim of preventing their economic downfall. Following GB, some other MFIs 
introduced MHI schemes with similar aims. These schemes may increase the health status of the 
participating households via increased health awareness and utilization of modern healthcare. 
Improved health status may lead to higher productivity, higher labour supply, fewer workdays lost, 
and reduced healthcare expenditure. In addition, if households are insured against health risk, they 
may invest in high return riskier assets because they do not need to retain cash or to hold highly 
liquid assets for precautionary purposes. Kochar (2004) finds, from a study in rural Pakistan, that 
overall savings of households rise in the expectation of future illness of adult males, but investments 
in productive assets decline. The empirical verification of this issue is important for policy 
decisions concerning the expansion and replication of MHI schemes.   
 
However, to date there has been very little research on the added effects of MHI. Mosley (2003) 
examined the added effects of the MHI scheme of BRAC2 on outcomes such as assets, household 
expenditure, current saving, educational expenditure, and education level. However, the study did 
not explore the impact on health outcomes. The evidence was not conclusive because the study was 
conducted at a very early stage of program development using a small sample. Other MHI studies 
have concentrated mainly on health outcomes: healthcare utilization and the equality of access to 
healthcare in the Philippines (Dror et al., 2005, 2006); healthcare use and out of pocket expenditure 
in Senegal (Jutting, 2004); the utilization of healthcare and financial protection from health shocks 
in Tanzania (Msuya et al., 2007); and cost recovery in Rwanda (Schneider and Hanson, 2007). 
However, there is no existing evidence regarding the impact of MHI on health outcomes in 
Bangladesh. This is a serious omission given the size of the microcredit sector in Bangladesh; 
according to the Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (http://www.pksf-bd.org) in December 2005, 
there were about 700 MFIs and 33.17 million microcredit members in Bangladesh.  
  
  6
In this paper, we have explored the added effects of MHI on a broad set of health outcomes: health 
awareness, utilization of modern healthcare and perceived health status. We use data collected from 
a primary survey of 329 households in three areas where GB operates microcredit programs. The 
areas are distinguished according to their experience of MHI: areas with at least five years 
experience of MHI, those with two years or less experience, and those where MHI is not available.  
Our evidence is based on econometric analysis of the impact of placement of MHI.  We find a 
positive association between MHI and all of our health outcomes; the results are statistically 
significant for the determination of health awareness and seeking formal care, but not for heath 
status. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of health, microcredit and 
MHI programs in Bangladesh; Section 3 describes the methodology; Section 4 gives the findings; 
Section 5 provides a discussion on the findings and Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
The constitutional commitment of the government of Bangladesh is to provide basic medical care to 
all its citizens. The government has been investing substantially since independence to develop the 
health infrastructure as well as strengthen health and family planning services with special attention 
to the rural population. Providing Primary Health Care (PHC) to attain ‘Health for All’ is the major 
thrust of the health program. There is a three tier mechanism for providing health care in rural areas: 
(i) domiciliary services provided by a Health Assistant and Family Welfare Assistant at the 
household level; (ii) Health and Family Welfare Centres at the union level3, and (iii) upazila Health 
Complexes (UHCs) at the sub-district level. UHCs provide both outpatient and inpatient services 
including maternal and child health and family planning; they are the main centre for implementing 
the Essential Services Package (ESP) which was designed to attain Health for All. In addition to 
public provision of healthcare, there is a large private sector in Bangladesh, that includes both not-
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for-profit and for-profit organizations; the former is relatively small and run by NGOs, MFIs and 
charitable institutions.  
 
Despite this infrastructure for healthcare delivery, the government has largely failed to meet the 
health care needs of the rural population and this is due mainly to supply side constraints. Firstly, 
problems in retaining doctors in UHCs due to poor working conditions; secondly, a lack of proper 
input and skill mix due to under-resourcing and recruitment problems; thirdly unfriendly and 
unapproachable behaviour of the health care providers which discourages contact from the local 
population; and finally the charging of unofficial fees. Thus, although there is under utilization in 
many UHCs, the majority of patients seek healthcare from private providers, especially from 
informal providers who often have no formal medical qualifications (BBS, 2006).  
 
Microinsurance refers to “the protection of low-income people against specific perils in exchange 
for regular premium payments proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk involved” 
(Churchill 2006:12). In order to expand into areas of social protection not covered in conventional 
loan-based microfinance, GB set up an MHI scheme for the poor to insure against some health 
risks4.  
 
The key features of the GB MHI scheme are shown in Table 1. GB sells annually renewable prepaid 
insurance cards to its clients and offers primary health care directly from health centres that it 
operates. The service package comprises mainly curative care and maternity and child health care. 
Non-cardholders can also seek healthcare from these health centres, but they are charged higher 
prices than cardholders. The annual premium is low; coverage for a family of up to six costs 
approximately 1.3 times the average daily male wage for GB microcredit members and 1.7 times 
for non-members. The main benefits include reduced medical consultation fees (40% of the fee to 
non-cardholders), discounts on drugs and tests, hospitalization benefits and free annual health 
  8
checks and immunization. There are three main ways that someone can join the scheme: GB 
members can join at weekly microcredit meetings where health workers explain the benefits of 
joining the MHI scheme; GB members can also enrol during the domiciliary visits provided by the 
health visitors; GB members and non-members may also buy insurance cards directly from the 
health centres. GB members can have the costs deducted directly from their GB savings accounts.  
 
 [Table 1] 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
(a) Data 
We collected primary data from a household survey in GB areas in 2006. At this time the MHI 
scheme was being operated in 32 GB branches; 14 of these had MHI for at least five years; and the 
remaining 18 for less than five years (two for two years or less). GB microcredit and MHI programs 
are identical across these branches. In order to construct a meaningful study design, we stratified 
branches into three distinct types: (i) GB1 - branches with at least five years experience of MHI; (ii) 
GB2 - branches with one or two years experience; (iii) GB3 - branches without MHI. 
 
The sample selection was multistage. One GB branch was selected randomly from each of GB1 and 
GB2; these are Madhabpur and Pakutia respectively. Madhabpur is located at Singair upazila (sub-
district) of Manikgonj district; it has had a microcredit scheme since 1983 and MHI was added in 
1996. Pakutai is at Nagarpor upazila of Tangail district it has had a microcredit scheme since 1986 
and MHI was added in 2004.  One GB branch (Joy Mantap) was purposively selected from GB3; it 
was chosen from the same upazila (Singair) as Madhabpur, in order to make a meaningful 
comparison group. There are 8 GB branches in Singair and a MHI scheme has been operating in its 
three unions (Madhabpur, Shaharil and Jamsaha) since 1996. Among the remaining five unions 
where GB has not yet placed its MHI scheme, Joy Mantap has had a microcredit scheme since  
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1983; it is adjacent to Madhabpur and they are connected by a main road. GB planned to introduce 
its MHI scheme into Joy Mantap in the near future5, which may reduce program placement bias in 
this design.   
 
Around 96 percent of GB members are female, so we selected only female members for our study. 
A list of all the villages holding at least one female centre of GB was prepared for each selected 
area. In the second stage, two villages from each area were selected randomly; a total of six 
villages. In the third stage, two female microcredit centres were selected randomly from each 
village where more than two microcredit centres existed. Each credit centre consists of 40-50 
microcredit members and they usually live in a particular area of the village. A list of current GB 
microcredit member households was made in each selected GB loan centre, using information 
obtained from respective branch offices of GB.  We attempted to interview all the eligible member 
households in the selected microcredit centres of each sampled village, in order to minimise sample 
selection bias. 
 
We used a set of questionnaires to collect both household level and village level information. The 
survey instruments were finalized after incorporating comments from a number of experts who 
were sent a preliminary draft, as well as feedback from two rounds of piloting. We employed six 
experienced female surveyors, comprising four field investigators, one field supervisor and one 
quality controller.  They were given five days of training on the purpose of the study and on the 
survey instruments.  
 
The main respondents were the female microcredit members, but some questions about household 
finances (income, expenditure, assets etc.) were asked to household heads and these are 
predominantly male.  The village level information was collected from the offices of the Union 
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Councils and key informants. The data was entered in SPSS v10 and converted to Stata v9 for 
analysis. One researcher entered the data and a second researcher checked the data entry.  
 
(b) Method 
 One of the major challenges in estimating the impact of a program like MHI using non-
experimental data is to deal with endogeneity – heterogeneity in unobservable individual 
characteristics of the participants and non-participants, which influences both the decision to 
participate in the scheme and the outcome. Random assignment of individuals into a treatment 
group and a control group is one solution but this is not possible here; hence it is necessary to 
choose an empirical model, which can control for endogeneity. 
 
Following the empirical literature on health insurance and microcredit (e.g. Pitt and Khandker, 
1998; Waters, 1999; Jutting, 2004) we firstly consider a structural equation:  
ijijyijij AXy εδβ ++=                                                                           (1) 
ijy  is the outcome of interest (health awareness, utilization of formal healthcare or health status) of 
household i in village )6. ijX  is a vector of observed individual, household and village 
characteristics (for example education, age, duration of membership in MHI). ijA  is a binary 
variable where ijA =1 if household i  of village j  participates in MHI and ijA = 0, otherwise; and 
ijε  is the stochastic error term. The estimate of δ  will give the unbiased effect of MHI on the 
outcome y only if ijA  is an exogenous variable.  
  
We then consider a reduced form (participation) equation:  
ijijAijij ZXA µφβ ++=                                                                             (2) 
ijX  is as defined in equation (1); ijZ  is a distinct set of household or village characteristics that 
affect only participation in the scheme ( ijA ), but not the outcome )( ijy conditional on ijA ; and ijµ  
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is the stochastic error term. Endogeneity arises when A  and ε  (or ε  and µ ) are correlated, 
resulting in biased estimates of δ .  
 
While conditioning on participation is the commonly used method for analysing the causal effect of 
health insurance as evidenced in the literature, this method is not appropriate for our research for a 
number of the reasons.  First, MHI may produce a lot of spillover or open access effects. This is 
because the MHI scheme offered by GB is different from a traditional three-party (the insurer, the 
insured and health service providers) health insurance system. GB MHI provides healthcare directly 
to their clients through establishing health centres instead of simply paying coverage. In addition, 
GB MHI offers health promotion and health education to all the microcredit members living in the 
catchment area of the health centre regardless of their participation in MHI. Moreover, the 
uninsured can seek healthcare from the health centres by paying the standard fees.  If these spillover 
effects are not taken into account, the impact of MHI will be severely underestimated. Second, there 
is a very high enrolment rate in MHI at GB1 (96%), so there are very few observations in the non-
participant group, hence the estimation of equation (1) may not give reliable findings.  
 
Thus, in what follows we focus on outcomes conditioned on placement of the program, rather than 
participation in the program. Available empirical literature on this method falls mainly into two 
groups; one has compared program and comparison groups where the program was in the pipeline 
(Chase, 2002; Galasso and Ravallion, 2004), the other has compared program and comparison 
groups where the program has not been placed at the time of survey (Amin et al., 1996; Hadi, 
2002). The model can be written as follows 
 
ijijijij PXy ελβ ++=                                                                        (3) 
y  and X  are as defined previously; P represents  program status where 1=P   if the household is 
drawn from a program area where MHI has been operating for at least five years (GB1); and 0=P  
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if the household is drawn from the comparison area where MHI was not placed at the time of survey 
(GB3). The estimate of λ  measures the average treatment effect of MHI. Measuring average 
treatment effect rather than average effect of treatment on the treated is sensible because non-
participants may also obtain benefits from MHI due to spillover effects. 
 
The major concern with this method is to control for program placement bias (the particular features 
that attract an organization to place the program in an area) and geographical heterogeneity, which 
may affect the outcomes. Social programs like MHI are rarely placed randomly; rather placement 
depends on both demand and supply side factors. The best way to ameliorate the effects of program 
placement bias is to select a suitable comparison area.  
 
We took the following measures to select a suitable comparison area. First, selecting the program 
area (GB1) and control area (GB3) from the same small geographical area to reduce geographical 
heterogeneity; second, choosing the control area where there is potential for placing the program in 
the near future to reduce the supply side bias of program placement; and third, conducting a survey 
to see whether eligible households in the control area would be willing to be insured if MHI were 
placed in their area, to control for demand side bias. Note that the willingness to enrol in MHI in 
GB3 was 98%, which is very similar to actual enrolment in GB1 (96%). In addition, we used a 
similar method to select the households from the program area and control area. It is also worth 
stressing that we conducted the survey on women microcredit members and these are a relatively 
homogeneous group of people, in both the program area and the control area.  
 
(c) Dependent Variables 
Our analysis considers three types of health outcome measures: health awareness, health status and 
heath care utilization, which can be considered to be related in a causal chain. We explore the 
relationships between our outcome measures in the results section. The cross section data used here 
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does not enable us to draw causal inferences but studying the outcomes independently is also a 
valuable contribution to the literature on the effects of MHI in Bangladesh.  
 
(i) Health awareness 
 Health awareness is measured in relation to three important aspects of health: diarrhoea, vitamin A 
deficiency and maternal health during pregnancy. These health problems cause a huge disease 
burden in Bangladesh7 and have been the focus of the ESP, which is targeted at ensuring health care 
for vulnerable groups. The problems arising from these three conditions can be reduced by 
increasing awareness about danger signs and treatments. This information is disseminated by the 
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare via posters, radio and television. In addition, the GB MHI 
scheme promotes this information in its health education activities.   
 
Respondents were asked to state the: (i) main treatments for diarrhoea; (ii) major natural food 
sources of vitamin A; (iii) major health danger signs during pregnancy. A list of all correct answers 
was provided to the interviewer but not shown to the respondent (see Table-A1 in the Appendix); 
the list also included an ‘other’ option to code incorrect responses. Respondents could therefore 
give multiple correct answers, multiple incorrect answers or state that they ‘do not know’. These 
responses were used to construct four separate indices of health awareness, giving a weight of one 
to each correct answer and zero to an incorrect answer or ‘do not know’. A pooled index was 
constructed incorporating all three health issues with equal weight8. The indices are given below:  
d
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AD =   ,                                    (4)                                                            
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where iAD , iAVA  and iAANC  are indices of awareness of diarrhoea, vitamin A and ante-natal care 
respectively and iPI  is the pooled (general) health awareness index for household i .  dn  represents 
the total number of major methods of treatment for diarrhoeal disease and id  represents the number 
correctly stated by respondent i . Similarly, vn  represents the total number of major sources of 
vitamin A and iv  the number of correct responses given; ancn  is the total number of major danger 
signs arising during pregnancy and ianc  the number of correct responses.   
 
Most of the previous literature on awareness about diarrhoeal diseases (Konde, 1992;  McLennan, 
1998), vitamin A deficiency (Genebo and Gelaw, 2000) and maternal health (Smith et al., 2004; 
Xue et al., 2007) has relied on closed questions.  We have used open questions to provide the 
respondents with sufficient scope to articulate their knowledge.  
  
 
(ii) Utilization of formal (modern) healthcare 
 The survey asked about any conditions suffered by any household members during the previous 
month. For all individuals experiencing acute or chronic illnesses9 we asked whether they received 
treatment for their condition in the past month, and what type of healthcare they received10. 
Healthcare was classified as: (i) informal - including self-treatment and care provided by 
practitioners with no formal medical training (e.g. drug store salesmen and traditional healers); (ii) 
public provision11; (iii) provided by MHI; and (iv) private (formal) provision12.  Categories (ii) to 
(iv) are classified as formal (or modern) healthcare.  
 
(iii) Health status 
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We use two measures of health status, self-assessed (general) health (SAH) and an index of physical 
functioning. For the former the microentrepreneur is asked how good their current health is 
compared to people of their own age, with responses on a five point scale: excellent, good, fair, 
poor and very poor. This is a standard question used in many national surveys, such as the European 
Community Household Panel and the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics. It is subjective and 
therefore may be prone to reporting bias. Most of the evidence on the validity of self-assessed 
health comes from the developed world and here a number of studies have shown it to be strongly 
correlated with more objective measures, such as mortality and the onset of a number of serious 
health conditions, even after controlling for socio-economic factors, physician health assessments 
and the presence of specific health conditions (see for example Idler and Benyamini, 1997; Hurd 
and McGarry, 1995). 
 
As an alternative, and arguably more objective, measure we have also used a set of physical 
functioning indicators usually termed activities of daily living (ADL). These indicators are ability 
to: carry a heavy load for 20 metres, sweep the floor or yard, walk for five kilometres, take water 
from a tube-well or a pond, bend, kneel, or stoop. This follows Gertler and Gruber (2002) and 
Gertler et al. (2009) who used this type of measure in the Indonesian context. For each function 
respondents can choose one of three responses: can do it easily (score 3), can do it with difficulty 
(score 2), unable to do it (score 1). An index is constructed, where the magnitude is one if the 
respondent is able to perform all the ADL easily, and zero if she is unable to perform any ADL. 
MinScoreMaxScore
MinScoreScore
ADL
−
−
=                                                                    (8) 
 
4. FINDINGS 
(a) Descriptive Statistics 
Sample characteristics are summarized in Table 2. A total of 329 households were surveyed; 136 
were from GB1, 85 from GB2 and 108 from GB3. The overall response rate was 73 percent, with 
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little variation across the three areas; and little variation in response rates between the insured and 
the uninsured13. The participation in MHI among the households interviewed in the survey was 82 
percent (96 percent at GB1 and 59 percent at GB2).  
 
There is no significant difference in socio-demographic features, apart from duration of 
membership in microcredit, average household income and sources of income, between the program 
area (GB1) and the control area (GB3). There is a significant difference in most of these features 
(duration of membership in microcredit program, male and female education, and age and sex 
structure) between GB1 and GB2. As per the design of the study there is a significant difference in 
duration of membership in MHI between these two areas. At GB1, about 64 percent of the insured 
had at least five years experience of MHI (the average experience is about six years) and at GB2, 96 
percent had only one years experience.   
 
Almost all the microentrepreneurs were aged between 17 and 64 years irrespective of the sample 
areas. Most of them were of reproductive age (15-49 years). More than 90 percent of the 
microentrepreneurs were married in all the sampled areas; the majority had no formal education; the 
formal education rate was higher in GB2 compared to other areas. The majority of the 
microentrepreneurs in GB2 and GB3 had household based self-employment14; and this was around 
44 percent for the microentrepreneurs in GB1. A good number (28%) of microentrepreneurs in this 
area had small businesses. Some microentrepreneurs (18%, 22%, and 17% for GB1, GB2, and GB3 
respectively) were not directly involved in any economic activity; rather, they gave the money 
borrowed from MFIs to someone else, either in or outside the household. Microentrepreneurs were 
themselves the household head in some cases (15%, 14%, and 10% at the GB1, GB2, GB3 
respectively), but the vast majority of households were male headed.  Like microentrepreneurs, the 
majority of the household heads had no formal education. Small business, farming and day labor 
were the major occupations of household heads in all the areas.  
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Table 3 reports correlations between the different outcome measures. There are significant 
correlations between almost all of the measures; in particular the pooled health awareness index is 
strongly correlated with SAH, ADL and formal health care use, and formal health care use is 
strongly correlated with health awareness.  Chronic disease status is also included here since it is 
used as a control variable in our multivariate analysis; it is closely correlated with self-reported 
health and ADL.  
 
(i) Health awareness 
The mean difference between (i) GB1 (established MHI) and GB2 (new MHI), (ii) GB1 and GB3 
(without MHI), and (iii) GB with MHI (both GB1 and GB2) and GB3 is positive and highly 
significant for all health awareness indices and the pooled index (see Table 4). Diarrhoea awareness 
(AD) is substantially higher than the other indices.   
 [Table 4] 
 
(ii) Utilization of formal (modern) healthcare 
About 59 percent of the households (193 out of 329) had at least one acute or chronic diseased person 
during the month prior to the survey. A total of 286 individuals had been sick in 193 households (85 in 
GB1, 48 in GB2 and 60 in GB3). We focus on the last episode of disease in each household. Most 
(94%) of the sick individuals received treatment. A substantial proportion of the insured did not seek 
healthcare from MHI in either GB1 or GB2. The majority of the households (52%) did, however, seek 
treatment from MHI in GB1 while the majority of the households in GB2 and GB3 sought healthcare 
from informal providers (see Table 5; Panel A)15. The proportional difference in the use of formal care 
between GB1 and GB2 and between GB1 and GB3 is positively significant at the one percent level (see 
Table 5; Panel B).  
[Table 5] 
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(iii) Health status 
The largest share of respondents reported their health status as good in each area (see Table 6; Panel 
A). The program area (GB1) had better health status compared to the comparison area (GB3). At 
GB1 about 84 percent of the respondents reported their health status as excellent, good or  fair. The 
corresponding figures for GB2 and GB3 were 73 percent and 68 percent respectively.  
[Table-6] 
There is a positive proportional difference between GB1 and GB3 in the good and fair categories of 
SAH and a negative difference in the poor category (see Table 6; Panel B)16. However, the 
difference is not significant for any category of SAH. For the ADL index, mean health status is high 
for all sub-sets of the data (see Table 6; panel B). The difference between GB1 and GB2, as well as 
between GB1 and GB3, is positive and significant at the five percent level. 
 
(b) Multivariate Analysis 
The regression results are presented in Table 7. The estimation technique is chosen depending on 
the form of the dependent variable: (i) OLS for the continuous pooled health awareness index (PI), 
since the histogram of the data is approximately normal17. We concentrate only on the pooled index 
because the descriptive statistics reveal similar results for all of the separate components; (ii) a 
probit model for the dichotomous variable utilization of formal healthcare; (iii) an ordered probit for 
SAH of the microentrepreneur, where very poor = 0, poor =1, fair =2, good =3 and excellent = 418. 
(iv) a Tobit model for the ADL index (as recommended by Austin et al., 2000 and Austin, 2002)19. 
The Tobit model is censored at full health because the distribution of the index is highly skewed to 
the left i.e. a substantial number of respondents have a score of one indicating a ceiling effect. For 
ease of interpretation all of the outcome variables are increasing in health (or health awareness); 
also all of the models are estimated conditioned on the placement of the program. The coefficient 
estimates for all models are reported in Table 7 and the marginal effects for the probit and ordered 
probit models are shown in the Appendix, Table A2.  
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The key explanatory variable of interest is MHI placement (1 = yes, 0 = no), and we expect a 
positive relationship with all of our outcome variables. The control variables included in these 
models are as follows. Age and squared age (in years) and marital status (1 = married, 0 = 
otherwise) of the microentrepeneur are included in models (i), (iii) and (iv). The direction of the 
relationship between health awareness and age is unclear a priori; experience may increase 
awareness but memory problems may decrease it. Marital status is likely to have a positive 
association with health awareness, especially in relation to maternal health, and there is also 
empirical evidence that health status is positively related to marriage, although most of this comes 
from developed countries. Model (ii) includes age (and squared age) and sex (1 = male, 0 = female) 
of the diseased person; for age the relationship with the outcome (utilization of formal health care) 
is not known a priori, but for sex we expect a negative relationship since the insurance cardholders 
are largely female and many are of childbearing age so are likely to seek formal care during 
pregnancy and for their children. All of the models, apart from (ii), include education level of 
microentrepreneur (completed years) and this is expected to be positively related to health 
awareness, but the direction of the effect on SAH and ADL is not clear.  Model (ii) includes 
education of the household head because the head usually decides where to seek healthcare; we 
expect this to be positively related to utilization of formal care. Model (ii) includes a dummy for 
whether the diseased person is chronically ill (1= chronically ill, 0 = otherwise) and we expect this to 
be positively related to the utilization of formal care; models (iii) and (iv) have a similar dummy for 
chronic disease status of the microentrepeneur and this is expected to be negative related to health 
status. All models include duration of membership in microcredit this is expected to be positively 
related to health awareness because the programs provide information on basic health promotion. 
We also expect it to be positively related to seeking formal health care, but there is no clear a priori 
relationship with health status. All models also include the literacy rate of the village (as a 
percentage) and it seems reasonable to expect that this is positively related to health awareness and 
utilization of formal care. Models (ii) to (iv) include per capita household income, which is 
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expected to contribute positively to all outcomes.  Since TV and radio are used to convey 
government health messages, ownership is expected to be positively related to health awareness. 
Thus, model (i) includes ownership of TV and radio (1 = yes, 0 = no).  
 
Looking across the columns in Table 7, education of microentrepreneur and ownership of TV and 
radio contribute positively to increase health awareness; sex of the diseased person, length of 
membership in microcredit program and per capita income have strong relevant influence on 
seeking healthcare from formal provider; and chronic disease status of microentrepreneur 
consistently influences the health status of both of the measures. In all cases the coefficient on MHI 
placement status is positive and it is statistically significant in determining health awareness and 
seeking healthcare from formal source. Turning to the marginal effects in Table A2, these appear 
sensible with MHI having a large effect on utilization of formal health care.  
 
In terms of the diagnostic statistics, the models appear to be well specified; each of them is jointly 
significant at the one percent level according to the F-, Wald or LR tests and there is no evidence of 
misspecification according to the RESET tests. The estimates of the threshold parameters are 
sensible. The explanatory power of the models is respectable for this type of cross section analysis 
with primary data. In addition to explore the effects of possible collinearities between the 
explanatory variables, each variable was excluded in turn and this made little difference to the 
existing coefficient estimates.  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Our findings suggest that MHI placement contributes to increasing awareness of important health 
problems and to the probability of seeking formal care. However, the contribution of MHI to 
improvement in health status is yet to be evidenced.  A number of factors may contribute to this 
result. First, there may be some reporting bias regarding the health status of the microentrepreneurs. 
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The majority report themselves to be in good health and it is possible that respondents, regardless of 
whether living in program area or comparison area, may have the idea that if they do not claim 
themselves to be healthy they may not obtain microcredit in the future. Second, MHI schemes 
provide basic primary healthcare, which may take a relatively long time to generate a significant 
impact on health status. GB does not provide secondary or tertiary healthcare from its health centres 
and although it maintains a referral mechanism for the higher levels of healthcare, this does not 
function effectively as we observed during the survey20.  
 
Third, many insured households do not seek treatment from the MHI health centres, instead they 
mainly seek healthcare from informal providers. There are a number of potential reasons for this 
(both demand side and supply side), and evidence for these was gathered during qualitative 
interviews with respondents during the fieldwork. There are the relatively high costs of seeking 
healthcare from MHI compared to available alternatives (especially, informal providers); the main 
sources of these costs are consultation fees and drugs. MHI schemes charge consultation fees (co-
payments) to deter over utilization of health care by the insured (moral hazard), and these payments, 
although relatively small, are a strong deterrent to these very poor households, who then prefer to 
use informal health care providers who may offer credit terms, even if the total cost of health care is 
then higher.  In addition, there are usually a number of alternative providers close to the home, 
compared to one busy MHI health centre. Further, as observed during our interview work, there is a 
substantial lack of understanding around risk-sharing and the role of insurance among the insured; a 
finding also reported by Desmet et al., (1999) in their study of insurance in Bangladesh. 
 
Fourth, there may have some program placement bias, i.e., MHI may have been placed in the areas 
where people had poorest health. Although some measures were undertaken this study could not 
fully control for program placement bias using cross section data. The GB MHI scheme has been 
gradually placed where government provision was not functioning well. If MHI was placed earlier 
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in the areas with the worst health we would expect this to bias our results against finding an effect 
of MHI placement. Finally, improvement of health status is a dynamic effect of MHI, thus a single 
cross section may not be adequate to capture the full impact of MHI. 
Our study uses primary data collected expressly for the purpose of assessing the impact of MHI, 
and we apply appropriate methods of analysis, however there are still some limitations; these 
largely arise from time and resource constraints21. First, the study is limited to a single cross 
section, and further work should focus on collecting longitudinal data in order to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity and reduce endogeneity bias, and also because it is more appropriate for 
the analysis of dynamic outcomes. Second, our sample is not completely representative of the 
insured population.  Although the GB MHI scheme is open to everyone, irrespective of GB 
microcredit status, the scheme does centre on microcredit members so we have focused on them22.  
While GB microcredit does try to include the poorest of the poor, it (like many similar schemes) 
may miss them. Finally, we only measure the health status of microentrepreneur, and not the health 
status of all the members in the households.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has outlined the mechanisms by which adding MHI to microcredit schemes can 
contribute to improving health awareness, health seeking behaviour and health status. We have 
investigated this in the context of GB, the largest microcredit organization in Bangladesh. Where 
MHI is available take-up rates are very high and there are large potential spill-over effects, so we 
have focused on the effects of MHI placement. Our results show a positive association between 
MHI placement and all of our health outcome measures. The results are statistically significant for 
the determination of health awareness and seeking formal care, but not for health status. A number 
of reasons have been suggested for our findings, which include problems in detecting long-term 
effects with our cross section data as well as shortcomings of the MHI scheme in question, 
including a lack of proper referral services and the adverse effects of protection against moral 
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hazard. Nevertheless, the study makes an important contribution to the literature as it provides 
comprehensive evidence on the impact of MHI on a broad set of health outcomes.  
 
Our findings are potentially important for the expansion or replication of MHI by MFIs in 
Bangladesh. However, in practice most MFIs do not have the capacity (either managerial or 
financial) to expand this provision. MHI has been mainly operated in the areas where government 
healthcare facilities are not functioning well. Thus, one possible solution is for government to 
contract out its poorly functioning health centres to the existing micro insurers. This could generate 
a number of benefits including saving the rental or construction costs of new health centres, 
enhancing the confidence of both clients and health personnel regarding the sustainability of the 
program, and avoiding inefficient duplication of health service provision.  
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Table-1:  A picture of the key features of the MHI scheme of GB   
Key features Grameen Kalyan of GB 
  
Type of organization 
 
• Insurer as well as a health service provider. 
Area coverage • December 2008: 39 unions of 25 sub-districts of 10 districts. The program is identical in 
all areas.  
 
Mechanisms for providing 
health services 
• Mainly through static clinics(1). 
• Also via mobile clinics, satellite clinics and domiciliary visits (by the health workers).  
• Limited emergency services through static clinics.  
• Referral services via agreements with some hospitals. 
 
Technical staff • An MBBS (Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery) doctor. 
• A female DMF (Diploma in Medical Faculty). 
• An office manger, a female paramedic, a laboratory technician and six community health 
assistants. 
• Some Trained Traditional Birth Attendants (TTBA) trained by Grameen Kalyan. 
 
Categories  of services covered 
 
• Preventive care including antenatal care (ANC).  
• Curative care (mainly outpatient care). 
• All the basic diagnostic services including ultra-sonography. 
• Some health promotion activities. 
Type of curative services 
provided 
• Essential Services Package (ESP) including safe delivery.  
Enrolment status 
 
• Voluntary. 
Proof of enrolment 
Affiliation unit 
• Insurance card. 
• Household. The program is identical for all enrolees. 
Eligibility criterion 
 
• GB member households or any villagers living within 8 km of health centre. 
Access of non-insured 
households to curative care 
• Yes. 
Premium  • Annual premium (covering up to 6 members) (2) 
§ For a GB member family: TK.120 (US $1.74) 
§ For a non member family: TK.150 (US $2.17)  
• Average daily wage 
§ Male: TK.90 (US $1.30) 
§ Female:  TK.60 (US $0.87) 
Benefit package for the 
cardholders  
• Co-payment:  
§ Medical consultation fee, cardholder: TK.10 (US $0.14)   
§ Medical consultation fee, non-cardholder: TK.25 (US $0.36) 
• Discount:  Discount for basic medicine(3) on MRP: 25%, for pathological tests on listed 
price: 30-35%, and for referred consultation visit: 50%. 
• Hospitalization benefit: Annually up to 2000TK (US $29) for a family. 
• Free: Annual basic check up for head of the family; immunization against six-diseases, 
domiciliary visits by health assistants. 
 
Additional health services 
package 
• School health package, Eye Mega Camp for cataract operations, and regular cataract 
operation programs. 
 
Financing mechanism • An initial endowment fund of Grameen Bank. 
•  Revenue generation from premiums and co-payment. 
 
Cost recovery rate • 100% (including the managerial costs and overhead costs of Regional Office and Head 
Office) in most of the old health centres. 
Joining mechanism  • at weekly microcredit meetings for GB members 
• via health visitor domiciliary visits for GB members 
• at health centres; for GB members or non-members.  
Source: Hamid et al., 2005b; Ahmed et al., 2005; and various official documents of SSS and Grameen Kalyan of GB. 
Notes: (1) Static clinics are the normal clinics where patients come to seek health services; in contrast to ‘satellite 
clinics’ where the physicians/nurses visit a location regularly to provide care. (2) TK.20 is charged for each additional 
member. (3) Basic medicine: 15 essential medicines are enlisted in the schedule of Government of Bangladesh. 
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Table-2: Socio-demographic characteristics of the sampled population 
 
Key features  GB1 GB2 GB3 Difference 
between 
GB1 and GB2 
Difference 
between 
GB1 and GB3 
 
No. of households 
 
136 85 108   
Survey response rate (%)  75 68 73 .05 .05 
Membership rate of households in GB 
microcredit program (%) 
 
 
 
 34 
 
32 
 
33 
 
0.02 0.01 
Average duration of membership in 
microcredit program (years) 
 
 
9.62  
(6.95) 
6.42 
(6.05) 
6.84 
(6.25) 
3.19*** 2.77*** 
Membership rate of households in MHI 
program (%) 
 
 96 59 - 37.5*** - 
 
Average length of membership in MHI  
program (years) 
 
 
 
 
6.01 
(2.96) 
 
1.00 
(0.20) 
 
- 
 
5.02*** 
- 
Average education level (male)  2.97 
(3.16) 
4.21 
(3.86) 
2.97 
(3.43) 
-1.24*** 0.00 
Average education level (female)  2.28 
(2.73) 
2.80 
(3.33) 
2.23 
(2.95) 
-0.51* 0.05 
Average household size  4.84 
(1.39) 
4.90 
(1.72) 
4.62 
(1.3) 
-0.06 0.23 
Female population (%)  49.09 55.16 48.50 -0.06** 0.01 
Average age   25.37 
(18.94) 
27.45 
(20.19) 
26.74 
(19.29) 
-2.08* -1.38 
Average male wage (USD)  
 
1.3 
(0.90) 
 
1.4 
(0.93) 
 
1.2 
(0.97) 
-0.01 0.01 
Average female wage (USD)  0.85 
(0.81) 
0.86 
(0.76) 
0.83 
(0.80) 
-0.01 0.02 
Average household income in USD  1301 
(728) 
974 
(489) 
874 
(414) 
326*** 427*** 
Income sources(1)       
 wages/salaries  0.18 0.25 0.26 -.07*** -.08*** 
 agriculture  0.23 0.26 0.28 -.03***   -.05*** 
 business  0.36 0.28 0.35 .08*** .01*** 
 other  0.23 0.21 0.11 .02*** .12** 
No. of MFIs working in area  5 6 5   
       
Note: 1. t-tests are used to test the statistical significance of the difference in each case. *** indicates significant at the 1% level, 
**5% level, * 10% level. Magnitudes in round parentheses are standard deviation.  
(1) Denotes proportion of total household income from each source.  
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Table 3: Pairwise correlations between outcome measures 
 Health awareness Health status  
 Vit A Diar Mat Pooled 
index  
SAH ADL Chronic  
Disease 
status 
formal 
health care 
use 
Vit A -- 0.50*** 0.57*** 0.83*** 0.19*** 0.12* -0.12* 0.35*** 
Diar -- -- 0.49*** 0.82*** 0.14** 0.13** 0.12* 0.36*** 
Mat --  -- 0.64*** 0.11* 0.07 0.02 0.34*** 
Pooled 
index 
-- -- -- -- 0.17*** 0.13** 0.02 0.45*** 
SAH -- -- -- -- -- 0.81*** -0.14** 0.09 
ADL -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.18*** 0.14* 
Chronic  
disease  
status 
       0.31** 
formal 
health 
care use 
-- -- -- -- -- --  -- 
Note:  *** indicates significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level.  
Spearman’s rank correlation used where outcomes are ordinal.  
 
 
Table-4: Mean and mean difference in health awareness index by GB branch type  
Health awareness indices Different groups of 
GB members AD AVA AANC Pooled index 
 diarrhoea Vitamin A Antenatal   
GB1 (established MHI) 0.60(0.15) 
 [136] 
 
0.34(0.19)  
[136] 
 
0.42(0. 17) 
[136] 
 
0.45(0.12) 
[136] 
 
GB2 (new MHI) 0.36 (0.15) 
[85] 
 
0.19 (0.14 ) 
[85] 
 
0.20 (0.19) 
[85] 
 
0.25(0.11) 
[85] 
 
GB3 (without MHI) 0.39 (0.17) 
[108] 
 
0.16 (0.16 ) 
[108] 
 
0.16 (0.17) 
[108] 
 
0.23(0.13) 
[108] 
 
GB1 and GB2 0.51(0.19) 
[221] 
 
0.28(0.19) 
[221] 
 
0.33(0.21) 
[221] 
 
0.37(0.15) 
[221] 
 
Difference between GB1 and 
GB2 
0.24*** 
 
0.16*** 
 
0.22*** 
 
0.20*** 
 
Difference between GB1 and  
GB3  
0.21*** 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.26 *** 
 
0.22*** 
 
Difference  between GB2 and 
GB3 
-0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.04 
 
0.02 
 
Difference between GB with 
MHI (GB1 and GB2)  and 
GB3 
0.12*** 
 
0.12*** 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.14*** 
 
Note: t-tests are used to test the statistical significance of the difference in each case. *** indicates significant at the 1% 
level, ** significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level. A two-tailed test is considered for each case.      
Figures in round parentheses are standard deviations. Figures in square parentheses are the number of observations. 
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Table-5:  
Panel A: Percentage distribution of households by the source of healthcare 
 
Percentage distribution of households Sources of Healthcare 
GB1 GB2 GB3 
 % n % n % n 
Informal 29.6 24 63.6 28 75.4 43 
Public 
 
2.5 2 6.8 3 7.0 4 
MHI 
 
51.8 42 15.9 7 1.8 1 
Private 
 
16.1 13 13.6 6 15.8 9 
Total 
 
100 81 100 44 100 57 
 
Panel B: Proportional difference in the utilization of formal (modern) care by different 
groups of GB members 
 
 
Proportional difference (in percentage) in the utilization of formal care 
Difference between GB1 and GB2 34.01*** 
Difference between GB1 and GB3 45.81*** 
Difference between GB2 and GB3 11.80 
Note: t-tests are used to test the statistical significance of the difference in each case. *** indicates significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level. A two-tailed test is considered for each case. 
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Table-6 
 
Panel A: Mean ADL score and percentage distribution of households by self-reported health 
status of the microentrepreneurs 
 
                                  Percentage distribution of households Self-reported 
health status GB1  
(Established MHI) 
GB2  
(new MHI) 
GB3  
(no MHI) 
 % n % n % n 
Excellent 0.7 1 0 0 4.6 5 
Good 57.4 78 38.8 33 45.4 49 
Fair 25.7 35 34.1 29 17.6 19 
Poor 16.2 22 25.9 22 28.7 31 
Very poor 0 0 1.2 1 3.7 4 
Total 100 136 100 85 100 108 
Mean ADL score 
(st. dev) 
0.88 
(0.19) 
 
0.81 
(0.22) 
 
0.82 
(0.23) 
 
          
 
Panel B: Difference in mean ADL index and proportional difference in self reported health 
status between different sub-sets of GB members 
 
 
Self-reported health status Proportional difference 
(in percentage)  
Good Fair Poor 
Difference in mean ADL  
index 
Between GB1 and GB2  19.27* -8.38 -10.88 
0.07*** 
Between GB1 and GB3  8.09 8.15 -16.23 
0.06** 
Between   GB2 & GB3 -11.18 16.53 -5.35 
-0.01 
Note: t-tests are used to test the statistical significance of the difference in each case. *** indicates significant at the 1% level, ** 
significant at the 5% level and * significant at the 10% level. A two-tailed test is considered for each case. 
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Table 7: Multivariate Analysis Results 
Explanatory variables (i) 
OLS estimation of 
health awareness 
(PI) 
(ii) 
Probit 
Utilization of formal 
healthcare =1 
 
(iii) 
Ordered probit self-rep. 
health (very poor = 0, 
poor =1, fair =2, good 
=3, excellent = 4) 
(iv) 
Tobit  
 ADL index 
Age of microentrepreneur  
-0.007 
(0.006) 
- 
0.058 
(0.050) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
Squared age of microentrepreneur  
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
- 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Age of the diseased person  - -0.023 
(0.018) 
- 
- 
Squared age of the diseased person 
- 0.0003 
(0.0002) 
- 
- 
Sex of the diseased person  ( 1= male) 
- -0.569** 
(0.266) 
- 
- 
Marital status of microentrepreneur (1= married) 
0.039 
(0.035) 
- 
0.074 
(0.297) 
-0.014 
(0.106) 
Education of microentrepeneur or household head(1)   
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.076* 
(0.041) 
 
0.012 
(0.038) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
 
Chromic disease of the household member  
(1= yes)   
- 0.533* 
(0.305) 
- - 
Chronic disease  of microentrepreneur (1= yes)   
- 
- 
-0.351** 
(0.172) 
-0.130** 
(0.057) 
Duration of membership in microcredit program 
0.002 
(0.001) 
 
0.040** 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.013) -0.003 
(0.004) 
Ownership of TV and Radio (1= yes)   0.036** 
(0.018) 
- 
- - 
Per capita household income (100 USD =1 unit) 
- 
0.164** 
(0.078) 
.076 
(.047) 
 
0.030* 
(0.016) 
Literacy rate (percentage) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
0.069 
(0.067) 
0.014 
(0.052) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
MHI placement (1= yes, 0= no) 
0.222*** 
(0.022) 
1.402*** 
(0.321) 
0.203 
(0.204) 
0.057 
(0.067) 
Constant 
0.041 
(0.241) 
-3.907 
(2.625) 
- 1.315** 
(0.670) 
Cut point 1 
- 
- 
-1.918 
(2.116) 
- 
Cut point 2 
- 
- 
-0.383 
(2.134) 
- 
Cut point 3 
- 
- 
0.280 
(2.133) 
- 
Cut point 4 
- 
- 
2.455 
(2.105) 
- 
Sigma 
- 
- 
- 0.320 
(0.023) 
No. of observations 244 138 244 244 
F-statistics /Wald chi2  / LR chi2 31.58*** 43.66*** 32.95*** 40.48*** 
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.479 0.308 0.0456 - 
Log pseudo likelihood/ Log likelihood - -66.196 -271.011 -112.476 
RESET F(3, 232) =   0.82 
Prob > F = 0.486 
chi2(1) =   0.23 
Prob > chi2 =0.628 
chi2( 1) = 0.18 
Prob > chi2 = 0.669 
F( 1,  234) = 0.00 
Prob > F = 0.968 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. Figures in the parentheses are Huber-White 
robust standard errors for ordered probit model and simple standard errors for tobit model.  Coefficients reported for probit and 
ordered probit models; marginal effects are shown in Appendix Table A2. 
(1) Education of the household head is applicable only for model (ii). 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table-A1: Questions used to collect data for health awareness 
 
How can you treat 
diarrhoea?  (Multiple 
responses are applicable) 
 
What are the major natural 
food sources of vitamin A? 
(Multiple responses are 
applicable) 
What are the major signs that arise at the 
time of pregnancy, which are very 
dangerous to the mother? (Multiple 
responses are applicable) 
1. OR saline   
2. Solution of salt and 
sugar/gur  
3. Water of green 
coconut  
4. Melted rice 
5. Consult with 
doctor 
6. Do not know 
7.  Others (specify) 
1. Carrot   
2. Sweet potato 
3. Sweet pumpkin  
4. Ripe papaya  
5. Ripe banana 
6. Molasses  
7. Amaranth leaves  
8. Do not know  
9. Other (specify) 
 
1. Severe headache and blurry 
vision 
2. Eclamsia 
3. Unsmooth delivery/ Delayed 
delivery 
4. Excessive bleeding 
5. High fever 
6. Does not know 
7. Others (specify) 
Note: The respondents were not shown possible answers during the interview. 
 
 
Table-A2: Marginal effects for the ordered probit and probit models in Table 8. 
 
Ordered probit self reported health Explanatory variables Probit 
utilization of 
formal 
healthcare =1 
 
v poor =0 
 
poor =1 
 
fair =2 
 
good =3 
 
excellent = 4 
Age of microentrepreneur (years) - -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Squared age of microentrepreneur  
- 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
0.0001* 
(0.0001) 
0.0004* 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Age of diseased person (years) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
- 
- - - - 
Squared age of diseased person 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
- 
- - - - 
Sex of  diseased person (1 = male) 
-0.224** 
(0.102) 
- 
- - - - 
Marital status of 
microentrepreneur (1= married) 
- 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.075 
(0.083) 
-0.007 
(0.026) 
0.026 
(0.106) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
Education of microentrepreneur 
(in years) 
0.030* 
(0.016) 0.000 
(0.001) 
0.096 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
Chromic disease status of 
household member  (1= yes)  
0.208* 
(0.115) 
- 
- - - - 
Chronic disease  status of 
microentrepreneur (1= yes) 
- 0.013 
(0.009) 
0.099* 
(0.052) 
0.028** 
(0.012) 
-0.126** 
(0.063) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
Duration of membership in 
microcredit program (in years) 
0.016** 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.023 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Per capita household income (100 
USD =1 unit) 
0.065** 
(0.031) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
0.026 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Literacy rate (percentage) 
0.027 
(0.027) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.026 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
MHI placement (1= yes, 0= no) 
0.515*** 
(0.098) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.051 
(0.056) 
-0.020 
(0.019) 
0.071 
(0.072) 
0.009 
(0.010) 
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Notes 
                                               
1 Grameen means ‘rural’ or ‘village’ in the Bangla language.  
2 One of the large MFIs in Bangladesh; its full name is Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. 
3 There are 64 districts in Bangladesh, and 482 ‘upazilas’ (or sub-districts), which are the lowest level of 
administrative government; each upazila is sub-divided into smaller local ‘unions’.  
4 Some other organizations (BRAC, Society for Social Services, Sajida Foundation, Shakti, Dhaka Community 
Hospital, Nari Uddug Kendra, Dushtha Shasthya Kendra, and Integrated Development Foundation) also offer a 
prepaid health program in Bangladesh but the GB program is the largest.  
5 GB did place its MHI scheme here later on, but it was subsequently withdrawn due to establishment of a hospital 
by a local philanthropist.   
6 The exact specification of the model depends on the nature of the outcome (continuous, binary, ordered). 
7 For up-to-date statistics on the health profile on Bangladesh, see www.searo.who.int 
8 Equal weights were chosen in the absence of information regarding the disease burden of each issue separately.  
9 Diseases are broadly classified into acute and chronic based on the UMS Chronic Disease List,  
www.ukzn.ac.za/ukznms/CDL%202006.pdf 
10 Information was collected regarding the first contact with a health provider for those who sought treatment. 
11 Public providers consist of the medical personnel of different government hospitals. 
12 Private providers include the medical personnel of private and NGO hospitals and clinics, and private practice of 
public providers. 
13 We could not interview some households due either to absence of the key respondent or unwillingness to take part. 
The survey was conducted during harvesting season hence people were away from home for long periods during the 
day. One repeat visit was made to absent households. Respondents were not pressurized nor offered motivation to 
take part in the interview. 
14 Livestock rearing, poultry feeding, farming, tailoring, etc. fall in this category. 
15 While MHI is not available in GB3, one of the households of GB3 sought healthcare from MHI at the special 
request of the Branch Manager of the microcredit program. 
16 As there are very few observations in the excellent and very poor categories, we have merged excellent with good 
and very poor with poor. 
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17 In further analyses we also applied an ordered probit model by breaking down the index into 5 equal groups; the 
results do not differ significantly from the OLS results reported here.  
18 In a Wald test for the parallel odds assumption underlying this model, which compares the estimates to those from 
a generalized ordered probit model (Boes and Winkelmann, 2006), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
19 We also estimated the ADL model using interval regression with robust standard errors, and the results are very 
similar to the tobit results reported here.  
20 Officially there is a provision that an insured household will receive up to TK.2000 (about US $29) annually as 
referral (hospitalization) benefits. This benefit was provided via external funding from the ILO. However the fund 
has been exhausted so the benefit is not longer provided in practice.  
21 There was no external research funding for this study. 
22 In purely practical terms our data collection was facilitated by the cooperation of GB. It would have been much 
more difficult for us to access people with no connection to GB, and given we had no funding for this work we 
decided not to do this. 
